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THE EXTENSION OF INSURANCE SUBROGATION 
Spencer L. Kimball* and Don A. Davist 
W HEN an insured loss occurs under circumstances that make a third person liable to reimburse the insured, there are 
various possible ways to adjust the loss among the three persons 
involved. One solution would permit the policyholder to recover 
both on the insurance and from the third person, i.e., would per-
mit double recovery for the loss. A second solution would give 
the third person the benefit of the insurance by denying recovery 
from him. A third solution would subrogate the insurer to the 
policyholder's rights against the third person. Combinations of 
these three solutions are possible by applying sometimes one and 
sometimes another.1 
Subrogation is either legal or conventional, i.e., it is either 
the creation of the law (or more accurately of equity)2 or it is the 
product of an agreement by the parties. In either case, the sub-
rogation solution rests mainly on two notions. The first is that 
there is no justification for giving a third person, who is neither 
privy to a contract nor a specified beneficiary, any benefit under 
it. This is strengthened by the moralistic basis of tort law as it 
has developed in our system.3 Although the first notion is of 
less importance than the second, it does serve to eliminate the 
second alternative solution above, of extending protection of the 
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.-Ed. 
t Senior Law Student, University of Michigan.-Ed. 
1 See 2 HAlu>ER &: JAMES, TORTS §§ 25.19-.23 (1956). All three of these solutions occur 
in Swedish law. HELLNER, FoRSAKRINGSGIVARENS R.EGRESSRAIT (The Insurer's Right of 
Subrogation) 258-59 (1953). 
2 11 APPLE~IAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 6502, at 293 (1941); 8 COUCH, CYCLO· 
PEDIA OF INSURANCE LAw § 1996 (1931); 5 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 2349 (2d ed. 
1918); SHELDON, SUBROGATION § 1 (2d ed. 1893). 
3 See, e.g., 2 HARPER &: JAMES, TORTS §§ 12.1, 25.19 (1956). But see GREEN, TRAFFIC 
VICTIMS: TORT LAW AND INSURANCE, ch. I (1958). The practical reflection of this doctrine 
is the refusal to reduce recovery in the injured person's action against the tortfeasor 
when the former I1as already received money from an insurance company. See Annot., 
13 A.L.R.2d !155 (1950), for the cases on personal insurance; Annot., 81 A.L.R. 320 (1932), 
for those on property insurance. 
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policy to the third person. The second notion is that most in-
surance contracts are in their nature contracts of indemnity-i.e., 
that the insurer's only obligation is to make the insured whole. 
Of course it makes some difference how the policyholder is made 
whole. If it is done by an entirely unrelated transaction, such as 
the gift of a stranger to the contract, the indemnity idea would 
not apply to prevent recovery under the insurance contract.4 
This notion tends to eliminate the first alternative solution above, 
of permitting the policyholder a double recovery. 
It is clear that the range of legal subrogation could be ex-
tended by agreement, but in the past companies have made few 
efforts to extend it. Although subrogation clauses are very com-
mon in insurance policies, on the whole they merely confirm 
rights that would exist without them, and at most they alter the 
incidents of legal subrogation in some particulars.5 But in recent 
years new incentives for extending the range of subrogation have 
come into existence. Increasing use of insurance has led to dupli-
cated coverage with respect to medical and hospital expenses. 
The companies urge that many claimants are unjustly enriched 
by the consequent double recovery.6 Moreover, rising loss ratios 
and vigorous price competition in some fields of insurance have 
led companies to seek for ways to effect marginal savings that 
4 In such a situation there arises the difficult and important question of deciding 
how far subrogation applies to collateral transactions. For discussions of this question, 
see Campbell, Non-Consensual Suretyship, 45 YALE L.J. 69, 79 (carrier contracts), 99 
(mortgage contracts) (1935); Friedman, Landlords, Tenants and Fires-Insurer's Right of 
Subrogation, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 225 (1957); King, Subrogation Under Contracts Insuring 
Property, 30 TEXAS L. REv. 62, 71-85 (1951) (in general): Comment, The Right of a 
Paid Surety to Subrogation, 44 MARQ. L. REv. 194 (1960) (depositor-bank contract). For 
general treatments, see 8 CoucH, op. cit. supra note 2, at § 2017; 2 RICHARDS, INSUR• 
ANCE § 188 (5th ed. 1952); VANCE, INSURANCE § 134, at 786-90 (3d ed. 1951). 
5 Compare Insurance Co. of North America v. Fidelity Title &: Trust Co., 123 Pa, 
523, 16 Atl. 791 (1889) (insurer cannot demand formal assignment as condition of pay• 
ment) with Niagara Falls Ins. Co. v. Fidelity Title &: Trust Co., 123 Pa. 516, 16 Atl, 790 
(1889) (insured's refusal to assign a good defense to an action on a policy containing a 
covenant to assign in the subrogation clause). These two cases were decided on the same 
day and presumably about the same fire. Only the policies were different. See also 
Hardware Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dunwoody, 194 F.2d 666 (1952); 8 CouCH, op. cit. supra note 2, 
§ 1997, at 6590; VANCE, op. cit. supra note 4, § 134, at 791; REsTATEMENT, SECURITY § 141, 
comment a (1941); King, supra note 4, at 62, 68. A change to pro tanto subrogation from 
subrogation only after full indemnity is dealt with infra, note 79. 
6 See, e.g., Katz, Automobile Medical Payments Coverage-A Changing Concept1, 28 
INs. COUNSEL J. 277 (1961); Explanatory Memorandum for Special Automobile Policy 
Form, dated Sept. I, 1959, attached to Standard Provisions for Automobile Combination 
Policies, filed with Michigan Department of Insurance by National Bureau of Casualty 
Underwriters (esp. 3-5). 
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may make the difference between a loss and a modest profit.7 An 
extension of the applicability of subrogation, together with a 
tightening up of subrogation practices, offers itself as such a 
measure. 
One recent development is the stipulation for subrogation 
rights in the medical payments coverage of the Special Auto-
mobile Policy of the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters 
and the Package Automobile Policy of the Mutual Casualty In-
surance Rating Bureau.8 Not only have the members of these 
bureaus stipulated for subrogation, but also many independent 
companies have recently issued policies with similar designations 
(e.g., Special Merit, Safe Driver, or Package policies) which pro-
vide for subrogation under medical payments coverage.9 Inter-
estingly, this change has not yet taken place in the standard 
family automobile policies issued by either the bureau companies 
or the independents. 
A second development is the stipulation in at least some 
hospital and medical service plans for subrogation rights. Both 
the Michigan Hospital Service (Blue Cross) and Michigan Medi-
cal Service (Blue Shield) include such stipulations in their con-
tracts, the former only since it was denied subrogation in the 
absence of such a stipulation by the Michigan Supreme Court.10 
A similar development would also be possible in accident and 
health insurance policies. Although no evidence of it was found 
in the files of the Michigan Insurance Department, where a sub-
stantial number of such contracts were examined to ascertain 
whether there was any such movement, there is a slight trace of 
such a tendency in the case law.11 
7 Interviews with insurance company executives in Detroit, August 1961. 
8 See Katz, supra note 6, at 276, 279. 
9 An examination of the automobile policies on file with the Michigan Department 
of Insurance, Lansing, in February 1962, for about a hundred independent companies, 
showed twenty-two companies that now issue special automobile policies stipulating for 
subrogation on medical payments coverage. Approximately another twenty companies 
did not appear to provide for medical payments coverage at all. Personal interviews 
with various insurance company executives in Detroit in August 1961 emphasized to us 
the importance of these developments in the minds of insurance men. 
10 Michigan Hosp. Serv. v. Sharpe, 339 Mich. 357, 63 N.W.2d 638 (1954), discussed 
at 860-62 infra; Letter from Manager, Workmen's Compensation-Subrogation Dep't, Mich. 
Blue Cross-Blue Shield, March 13, 1962. We have no information about the extent to 
which similar stipulations are used by corresponding plans in other states. 
11 See Application of Maak, 30 Misc. 2d 610, 222 N.Y.S.2d 845 (Sup. Ct. 1961). 
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The apparent resurgence of interest on the part of insurers12 
in securing subrogation rights and pursuing them more vigorously 
is unlikely to have competitive repercussions. If the novel in-
clusion of a subrogation clause were a more dramatic or more 
detrimental change in terms, it might be difficult to use it in a 
competitive market. But it is a nearly invisible method of com-
pensating for the obvious consequences of competition. 
In view of these developments, judicial treatment of insurance 
subrogation, whether legal or conventional, takes on increasing 
importance. The courts often hold legal subrogation to be in-
applicable to certain insurance contracts, and the first inquiry 
of this article will be to try to determine where the law draws 
the line between policies to which legal subrogation applies and 
those to which it does not. Next, some of the cases by which the 
line has been drawn will be examined in an effort to ascertain 
the reasons for drawing the line in that place, and the present 
applicability of those reasons. Finally, and the prime objective 
of this paper, there will be an inquiry into the extent to which an 
insurer can effectively stipulate for subrogation rights that might 
not exist in the absence of agreement, i.e., how far the contractual 
terms of the policy are effective to enlarge the non-consensual 
subrogation _rights of insurers. This latter question cannot be 
definitive, for the cases are few, but the inquiry would seem to 
turn on the reasons for the limitations on legal subrogation, the 
extent to which the reasons have lost their force since the rules 
were initially developed, and the degree to which those reasons 
are outweighed by a public policy in favor of freedom to contract. 
J. APPLICABILITY OF LEGAL SUBROGATION 
If one uses sufficiently ambiguous terms, it is not difficult to 
draw the line dividing those policies of insurance on which legal 
subrogation has been said to be available from those on which 
12 Interviews with insurance executives in Detroit in August 1961 gave the impression 
that there was an increasing interest in subrogation recoveries. There are also some 
indications in the literature. See Katz, supra note 6; The National Undenvriter (F &: C 
ed.) Feb. 9, 1962, p. 32; The National Underwriter (F &: C ed.) Feb. 23, 1962, p. 13; 
Sinnott, Subrogation Investigations of Fires and Explosions, INs. L.J., Jan. 1962, P. 41. 
But Lowry, Recoveries in Fire Losses-An Increasingly Attractive Field for Lawyers, with 
Suggestions for Handling Subrogation Claims, in A.B.A. SECTION OF INSURANCE LAw PRO-
CEEDINGS 198 (1949) suggests by its existence that the resurgence of interest is of periodic 
occurrence. 
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it is not. Thus Appleman states that "the insurer is not sub-
rogated to the insured's rights or to the beneficiary's rights under 
contracts of personal insurance .... "13 Couch views subrogation 
as a doctrine intended merely to carry out the principle of in-
demnity.14 Both these approaches have an implicit defect, that 
the terms "personal insurance" and "contract of indemnity" are 
ambiguous. A somewhat higher degree of precision can be at-
tained by listing the lines of insurance on which subrogation is 
available and those on which it is denied, as is done by Richards 
and Vance.111 This has its own difficulties as will appear from what 
follows. Despite its weaknesses, this latter approach is the most 
profitable one to follow. In most lines of insurance the result is 
clear, but in borderline cases the result is uncertain. Let us look 
only at those lines of insurance where subrogation is always or 
sometimes denied, in the absence of a contractual stipulation, 
for the objective of this article is to determine how far stipulation 
can change the rule in these cases. 
In life insurance, there seems little doubt that, absent con-
tractual stipulation, subrogation would be denied uniformly. 
Dicta are plentiful, but no cases actually decide the matter.16 One 
accident insurance case denies subrogation on a death claim, 17 
and perhaps that is sufficient authority for life insm:ance; in any 
case the dicta are so plentiful and so uniform that holdings are 
doubtless unnecessary to establish the proposition.18 
Cases in accident insurance are few but, apart from special 
situations, are uniform in result. Subrogation against the tort-
feasor is denied, the courts usually emphasizing that accident in-
13 3 .APPLEMAN, op. cit. supra note 2, § 1675; at 278. 
14 8 CoucH, op. cit. supra note 2, § 1997, at 6590. 
ll'i RICHARDS, op. cit. supra note 4, § 184, at 656; VANCE, op. cit. supra note 4, § 134. 
16 Two cases repeatedly cited for the proposition that there is no subrogation in 
life insurance actually have nothing to do with subrogation. Mobile Life Ins. Co. v. 
Brame, 95 U.S. 754 (1877); Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. New York &: N.H.R.R .• 
25 Conn. 265 (1856). These cases are discussed at 849-50 infra. They have rather frequently 
been misread. See, e.g., 3 Appleman, op. cit. supra note 2, § 1675, at 278; 2 RtcHARDs, 
op. cit. supra note 4, § 184, at 656; VANCE, op. cit. supra note 4, § 134, at 796; 3 CoLUM. 
L. REv. 422 (1903); 7 MICH. L. R:Ev. 177, 178 (1908). Accident insurance cases regularly 
assume that subrogation is not available in life insurance. 
17 Mercer Cas. Co. v. Perlman, 62 Ohio App. 133, 23 N.E.2d 502 (1939). 
18 Only one case casts any doubt on this general proposition, and it not very much, 
for it seems to misapply the subrogation idea. The holding could better rest on the-
res judicata idea. In any case it is authority only for a narrow range of problems. 
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Tremblay, IOI Me. 585, 65 Atl. 22 (1906). 
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surance is analogous to life insurance.19 The only real difficulty 
with accident insurance lies in rarely litigated peripheral areas, 
such as automobile medical payments or plans to cover medical 
expenses or hospitalization costs. A recent case in Michigan has 
made it clear that in the absence of contractual stipulation a 
hospital service plan (Blue Cross) is not subrogated to claims 
against the tortfeasors.20 Medical payments coverage in the auto-
mobile insurance policy lies similarly on the periphery of accident 
insurance.21 No case has been found deciding the question 
whether, absent stipulation, subrogation is available in such in-
surance, though the circumstances raising the problem have ex-
isted countless times. However, the persistent failure to seek 
subrogation under the coverage is strong testimony to the tacit 
assumption of company counsel that it is not available.22 The 
problem could have been raised, but was not, in a recent Wis-
consin case in which the company sought to avoid payment.23 
The fact that the case was argued by the company and was de-
cided on quite another basis-an excessively technical one-is 
even stronger indication of the widespread assumption that legal 
subrogation is not available. 
In workmen's compensation insurance, the question whether 
there is subrogation arises at two levels. It must first be asked 
19 "The case seems to tum on whether a contract of casualty insurance [here, acci-
dent insurance] is one of indemnity like that of fire insurance. While there is some 
conflict, by the great weight of authority a life insurance contract is not of that kind 
but is strictly a valued policy • • . . A policy of casualty insurance, ordinarily, has 
much the same features as one of life insurance, though, it is true, it more nearly 
than one of life insurance has the indemnity feature." Gatzweiler v. Milwaukee Elec. 
Ry. & Light Co., 136 Wis. 34, 37, 116 N.W. 633, 634 (1908). Accord, Suttles v. Railway 
Mail Ass'n, 156 App. Div. 435, 141 N.Y. Supp. 1024 (1913); Mercer Cas. Co. v. Perlman, 
62 Ohio App. 133, 23 N.E.2d 502 (1939); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Parker, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 
521, 72 S.W. 621 (1902), modified, 96 Tex. 287, 72 S.W. 168 (1903). 
20 Michigan Hosp. Serv. v. Sharpe, 339 Mich. 357, 63 N.W.2d 638 (1954), 43 A.L.R. 
2d 1167. Accord, Publix Cab Co. v. Colorado Nat'l Bank, 139 Colo. 205, 338 P.2d 702 
(1959) (relying on Sharpe). See also Royer v. Eskovitz, 358 Mich. 279, 100 N.W.2d 306 
(1960). 
21 However, it is authorized as a part of "personal injury liability insurance." E.g., 
NEW YoRK INs. LAw, § 46(13). But this is a matter of historical accident, and does not 
really indicate the nature of the coverage. 
22 Personal interviews with various insurance companies, Detroit, Michigan, August 
1961; see also Katz, supra note 6, at 279. 
23 Kopp v. Home Mut. Ins. Co., 6 Wis. 2d 53, 94 N.W.2d 224 (1959). Perhaps an 
even more striking, though less direct, demonstration is afforded by Severson v. Mil-
waukee Auto. Ins. Co., 265 Wis. 488, 61 N.W.2d 872 (1953), which held an injured 
person entitled to recover both under liability and medical payments coverages for the 
same damages, and on the same policy. After this decision it is no wonder that the 
companies would like a subrogation provision for medical payments. 
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whether the employer who pays compensation is subrogated to 
the rights of the employee against the tortfeasor. The second 
question is whether, in those cases in which there is insurance, 
the insurer is subrogated to any subrogation rights the employer 
may have.24 The latter question is not different in principle from 
the question whether any liability insurer is subrogated to the 
rights of its policyholder to contribution or indemnity against 
third persons, in cases where the insurance policy covers the 
policyholder's liability. Both in principle and on the authorities 
it is clear that generally a liability insurer has legal subrogation to 
whatever rights the policyholder may have to contribution or 
indemnity.20 In principle the same result should obtain in work-
men's compensation insurance, though there are cases deciding 
the point both ways.26 
Nearly all of the workmen's compensation statutes deal ex-
plicitly with subrogation, usually providing that either the em-
ployer or his insurer is subrogated to the rights of the employee 
against any tortfeasor liable for the injuries. The exact scope 
and terms of the subrogation differ widely among the states,27 
and the details of the statutory provisions are of no special interest 
to us here. In general the statutes do not distinguish between 
the two levels of subrogation, but deal simultaneously with both 
of them. 
Larson says that three states have no statutory provision for 
subrogation.28 From these states, West Virginia, Ohio, and New 
Hampshire, we get some light on the question whether legal sub-
rogation exists in workmen's compensation insurance, absent a 
statute, though the problem that is actually discussed in the 
24 De Roode v. Jahncke Serv., 52 So. 2d 736, 743 (La. App. 1951) recognizes the two 
levels of inquiry. See also Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp. v. Daley, 183 Misc. 975, 51 
N.Y.S.2d 567 (Sup. Ct. 1944). 
25 Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Great Lakes Eng. Works Co., 184 Fed. 426 (6th Cir. 1911) 
(employers liability); Preferred Acc. Ins. Co. v. Mustante Berman & Steinberg Co., 133 
Conn. 536, 52 A.2d 862 (1947) (general liability); 8 APPLEMAN, op. cit. supra note 2, 
§§ 4932-34; 8 CoucH, op. cit. supra note 2, § 2022 (Supp. 1961). 
26 For cases denying subrogation at the second level even though the employer was 
by statute subrogated to the insured employee's rights, see Henderson Tel. & Tel. Co. v. 
Owensboro Home Tel. & Tel. Co., 233 S.W. 743 (Ky. 1921), 35 HARv. L. REv. 343; 
Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Englander, 93 N.J. Eq. 188, 118 Atl. 628 (1921), 21 MICH. 
L. REv. 489 (critical) (suggesting different result under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-40 (1959)); 
Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Archer, 203 S.W. 796 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918). None of these 
cases is well reasoned. 
27 2 LARsoN, WOUMEN'S COMPENSATION § 74 (1961). 
28 But see N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 281:14 (Supp. 1961). 
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cases is the first level of subrogation, of the employer to the rights 
of the employee against the tortfeasor. They seem to announce a 
uniform result, that there is no such subrogation without a 
statute.29 
Even in states in which statutes provide for subrogation, the 
question whether legal subrogation exists independently of the 
statute may still arise in a variety of ways. Though some of the 
cases in which this question arose held that there was legal sub-
rogation without any statutory provision for it, it is not irrelevant 
that the state's general legislative policy in favor of subrogation 
had been made clear, but that for "technical reasons the case lay 
outside the reach of the statutory provisions. This fact diminishes 
greatly the force of the cases. On the whole, it would seem that 
on the authorities there is no subrogation of the employer to the 
rights of the employee absent a statutory provision to that effect.30 
29 Crab Orchard Improvement Co. v. Chesapeake 8e 0. Ry., 115 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 
1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 702 (1941), 40 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 1452 (1940). In this case the 
federal court, applying West Virginia law held that an employer who had to pay in-
creased amounts to state compensation fund because of an injury to an employee could 
not recover on subrogation, indemnity or simple tort theories. See Mercer v. Ott, 78 W. Va. 
629, 89 S.E. 952 (1916) (employee's recovery from tortfeasor bars subsequent state com-
pensation claim). Contra, Powell v. Wagner, 178 F. Supp. 345 (E.D. Wis. 1959) (payment 
of medical bills by Industrial Commission does not diminish recovery from tortfeasor 
or insurer); McCullough v. Varick Co., 90 N.H. 409, 10 A.2d 245 (1939) (subrogation 
clause in policy does not subrogate insurer to employee's rights); Holland v. Morley 
Button Co., 83 N.H. 482, 145 Atl. 142 (1929) (recovery from tortfeasor no bar to statu-
tory recovery from employer); Midvale Coal Co. v. Cardox Corp., 152 Ohio St. 437, 89 
N.E.2d 673 (1949) (employer permitted direct recovery against tortfeasor whose act was 
also breach of contract with employer); Decker Constr. Co. v. Mathis, 122 N.E.2d 38 (Ohio 
Ct. C.P. 1953) (refusing to extend .Midvale absent contractual relationship). In Truscon 
Steel Co. v. Trumbull Cliffs Furnace Co., 120 Ohio St. 394, 166 N.E. 368 (1929), the court 
relied on Omo R.Ev. CODE ANN. § 4123.82 (Page 1958) which was intended to prevent 
competition by private insurers with the state fund; subrogation was denied. 
30 Jacobson v. Doan, 136 Colo. 496, 319 P.2d 975 (1957) (subrogation denied beyond 
statutory figure despite higher benefits in policy); Geneva Constr. Co. v. Martin Transfer 
8: Storage Co., 4 Ill. 2d 273, 122 N.E.2d 540 (1954) (statutory subrogation provision tech-
nically unconstitutional but legal subrogation nevertheless available); De Roode v. 
Jahncke Serv., 52 So. 2d 736 (La. App. 1951); Stinchcomb v. Dodson, 190 Okla. 643, 126 
P.2d 257 (1942) (defense based on an inadequate assignment to reciprocal exchange, sub-
rogation still available). Contra, United States Fid. 8e Guar. Co. v. Elam, 198 Tenn. 194, 
278 S.W.2d 693 (1955) (employee's agreement to subrogation implied from acceptance of 
services beyond statute). For an assertion that subrogation provisions of the workmen's 
compensation act are merely declaratory of the common-law rule, see Fidelity 8: Cas. 
Co. v. St. Paul Gas Light Co., 152 Minn. 197, 200, 188 N.W. 265, 266 (1922) (dictum). 
In Potoczny v. Vallejo, 170 Pa. Super. 377, 85 A.2d 675 (1952), the City of Philadelphia 
was required by statute to pay firemen, injured in the course of their employment, 
regular wages during the period of incapacity. The city was held to be subrogated to 
a fireman's claim against a tortfeasor. Contra, City of Birmingham v. Walker, 267 Ala. 
150, 101 So. 2d 250 (1958). 
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JI. REASONS FOR DENYING LEGAL SUBROGATION 
An old book on insurance, Joyce, states that "marine and 
fire insurance is a contract of indemnity, and it is for the purpose 
of carrying out this principle that the doctrine of subrogation has 
been adopted. In other words, in the absence of this doctrine, the 
insured might often recover more than a full indemnity, and to 
prevent such a result the courts have adopted the rule that the 
insured shall be entitled to only one full indemnity for the injury 
sustained, and from this the doctrine of subrogation has arisen."31 
There is ample basis in the case law for thus tying the indemnity 
principle and subrogation closely together. On the authorities, 
subrogation is justified by the indemnity character of the insur-
ance contract, and denial of subrogation must rest on the fact 
that the contract of insurance in question is not an indemnity 
contract.32 
Uniformly, life insurance is said not to be an indemnity 
contract. Equally uniformly it is said to be "well settled that an 
insurer making payment under a life policy is not entitled to be 
subrogated to any rights against a tort-feasor who may have wrong-
fully brought about the death of the insured."33 This proposition 
is regularly supported by citation to two cases which are alike 
both in facts and in reasoning. In the earlier,34 the insurer issued 
a life policy on a man who was thereafter killed in a railroad 
accident. The insurer, having paid the administratrix, sought to 
recover the sum from the railroad. The latter pleaded that in 
ignorance of the policy it paid the administratrix 5,000 dollars in 
full satisfaction and discharge of claims. The plaintiff demurred 
Sl 5 JoYCE, INSURANCE § 3537, at 5880 (2d ed. 1917); 3 APPLEMAN, op. cit. supra note 
2, § 1675, at 278. Essentially the same statement appears in 8 CoucH, op. cit supra 
note 2, § 1997, at 6590. 
32 "That doctrine [subrogation] does not arise upon any of the terms of the contract 
of insurance • • • it is a doctrine in favour of the underwriters or insurers in order 
to prevent the assured from recovering more than a full indemnity; it has been adopted 
solely for that reason." Castellain v. Preston, 11 Q.B.D. 380, 387 (1883). "A contract 
of insurance against fire is only a contract of indemnity, and I think that the foundation 
of the doctrine of subrogation is to be found in the principle that no man should be 
paid twice over in compensation for the same loss." Driscoll v. Driscoll, 1 Ir. R. 152, 
159 (1918). "It follows that where the indemnity feature is not present in the insurance 
contract • • • the subrogation feature has no application." Crab Orchard Improvement 
Co. v. Chesapeake &: 0. Ry., 115 F.2d 277, 281 (4th Cir. 1940). See also Bradburn v. 
Great W. Ry., L.R. 10 Ex. 1 (1874). 
83 VANCE, op. cit. supra note 4, § 134, at 796. 
34 Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. New York &: N.H. R.R., 25 Conn. 265 (1856). 
The second case to the same effect was Mobile Life Ins. Co. v. Brame, 95 U.S. 754 (1877). 
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and the case was decided on the demurrer. By thus demurring, the 
plaintiff relinquished any claim in right of the policyholder. In-
deed, action was brought in the name of the insurer itself, and 
in its own right. Patently the case decides nothing about the law 
of subrogation, and holds only that the insurer has no direct 
action against the tortfeasor. One of the court's reasons, that the 
death of a human being is not actionable, would indeed preclude 
subrogation in life insurance cases, but that reason is not suscep-
tible of extension to other than death cases, nor has it survived 
the intervening century intact.35 The court's second reason for 
denying liability was that the damage to plaintiff was remote and 
indirect, inasmuch as there was no privity of contract between 
insurer and tortfeasor.36 
Only a single case deals directly with subrogation on a death 
claim, and that under an accident insurance policy.37 It holds that 
subrogation is not available. The court emphasized the absence of 
an indemnity feature as a ground for denying recovery; in general 
its reasoning is neither clear nor satisfactory. In particular, the 
court does not explain what it means when it says that the insur-
ance contract has no indemnity feature. This is more complicated 
than it is generally assumed to be, and the complexity begins to 
show up in accident insurance cases. A leading case says: 
"The case seems to turn on whether a contract of casualty 
insurance ["casualty" seems to mean "accident" here] is one 
of indemnity like that of fire insurance. While there is some 
conflict, by the great weight of authority a life insurance 
contract is not of that kind but is strictly a valued policy; a 
stipulation to pay a sum certain upon the happening of a 
specified contingency .... Under such a policy the amount 
payable has no necessary relation to damages actually suffered 
by the beneficiary. The insured buys and pays for the right 
to have from another a specified sum upon the happening of 
a specified event. Payment for the insurance is in the nature 
35 Every American state now has a statutory remedy for wrongful death. PROSSER, 
TORTS § 105, at 710 (1955). Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Moses, 287 U.S. 530 (1933), is a work-
men's compensation case subrogating the insurer on a death claim. See also Reutenik 
v. Gibson Packing Co., 132 Wash. 108, 231 Pac. 773 (1924). 
36 Accord, Insurance Co. v. Brame, 95 U.S. 754 (1877). Rockingham Mut. Fire Ins. 
Co. v. Bosher, 39 Me. 253 (1855), denies recovery to the company in its own name on 
a fire policy, though subrogation would be available. 
37 Mercer Cas. Co. v. Perlman, 62 Ohio App. 133, 23 N.E.2d 502 (1939). 
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of an investment. The money value of the thing covered by 
the insurance does not enter into the transaction at all."38 
In subsequent cases the characterization of life insurance as 
an "investment" contract was seized upon. Subrogation is attached 
to indemnity policies; it is not available in contracts of "invest-
ment."39 But the word "investment" must not be taken in its 
more obvious meaning. Ordinary, limited payment, and endow-
ment life insurance contracts written on a level premium basis 
are investment contracts in a very literal sense. But short term 
life insurance is not. It is no more an investment contract in the 
ordinary sense of that phrase than is fire or liability insurance. 
Yet surely the same subrogation rule would be uniformly applied 
by all courts to both ordinary and term life insurance. At least 
we have nowhere seen any suggestion that term life insurance 
should be regarded as an indemnity contract because it lacks an 
investment feature, nor that any distinction should be drawn for 
subrogation purposes between ordinary and term life insurance. 
Moreover, accident insurance cases uniformly deny subrogation, 
though an accident policy is very little, if any, more of an "invest-
ment" contract in the ordinary sense than is a fire policy. Rather, 
what the above quotation seems to make clear is that the crucial 
distinction is not between indemnity and investment but between 
a policy that merely makes the policyholder whole and one that 
pays a specified sum on the happening of the event insured against; 
i.e., it is a "valued" policy that is to be regarded as an "invest-
ment" or "non-indemnity" contract, for purposes of subrogation. 
In German terminology it is customary to divide insurance 
into "damage" insurance and "personal" insurance. The latter 
is also often called "sum" insurance,40 though as we shall see, there 
38 Gatzweiler v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. &: Light Co., 136 Wis. 34, 37, 116 N.W. 633, 
634 (1908). 
39 "[T]he defendant is not entitled to have the damages reduced because the plaintiff 
had purchased and paid for the right to have indemnity in case he sustained accidental 
injuries, The sums paid for such insurance are in the nature of an investment, which, 
like other investments made by the plaintiff, ought not to inure to the benefit of the 
defendant. The only parties interested in such a contract of insurance are the plaintiff 
and the insurer." Campbell v. Sutliff, 193 Wis. 370, 374, 214 N.W. 374, 376 (1927). "The 
fund out of which such payments were made was created in part by the plaintiff's con• 
tributions made under a contract with strangers to the defendant, and the tort-feasor 
was no more entitled to be credited with the sums repaid to the plaintiff under such 
contracts than it would be to his withdrawal of his accumulations in a savings bank." 
Comish v. North Jersey St. Ry. Co., 73 N.J.L. 273, 274, 62 Atl. 1004, 1005 (1906). 
40 Section 1 of the German Versicherungsvertragsgesetz (Insurance Contract Law) dis-
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is some difficulty with these divisions. The German Insurance 
Contract Law41 is divided into a general part and a number of 
special parts, one of which deals with "damage" insurance.42 In 
the part dealing with damage insurance is a section providing for 
the subrogation of the insurer against the policyholder.43 Thus, 
the distinction drawn in German law is, basically, the distinction 
that is suggested here for American law, i.e., between a contract 
of indemnity and a valued contract. But in the borderline cases, 
German insurance law has the same kind of problems that perplex 
us, and we shall refer later to the disposition made of the problem 
in Germany. 
If the boundary between subrogation and no subrogation, in 
the absence of stipulation, is to be settled by distinguishing be-
tween indemnity and valued contracts, as suggested, it must be 
decided whether to examine and classify individual contracts or 
only whole lines of insurance, despite some or even many deviant 
individual contracts within the line. Though all, or nearly all, 
life insurance contracts are valued or "sum" contracts, it is more 
difficult to speak with the same assurance about other lines of 
insurance. For example, in marine insurance and fire insurance44 
tinguishes Schadenversicherung or damage insurance, in which the obligation of the in• 
surer is to compensate the policyholder for the damage actually suffered, and Personen• 
versicherung or personal insurance, in which the obligation is to pay an agreed sum. 
The term Summenversicherung may be found in, e.g., GIERKE, VERSICHERUNGSRECHT 1:78 
(1937). It is quite apparent that the latter term is inappropriate for medical expenses 
coverage, where the compensation principle applies. What is less apparent is that the 
term Personenversicherung is also inappropriate, at least if such coverage is treated as 
Schadenversicherung, as the sources often treat it. See, e.g., PRoLSs, VERSICHERUNGSVERTRAGS· 
GESETZ § 67, at 257 (12. Auflage 1960): "[w]ohl aber fiir den Kur- und Heilkostenersatz in 
der Unfallversichemng ••• der in den Bereich der Schadensversicherung fallt." 
41 Versicherungsvertragsgesetz, most readily accessible in PRoLSS, VERSICHERUNGSVER· 
TRAGSGESETZ (12. Auflage 1960), a standard and convenient commentary on the code. 
42 Schadensversicherung (damage insurance) is the subject of the second part, Lebens-
versicherung (life insurance) of the third, Unfallversicherung (accident insurance) of the 
fourth, and a fifth part has some concluding general provisions. Krankenversicherung 
(health insurance) has no special part, and its treatment provides some of the problems 
of interpretation with which German lawyers must deal. 
43 § 67. 
44 Many state statutes require valued policies for fire insurance on real property. 
For a brief history and analysis of the Wisconsin valued policy law, see KIMBALL, INSUR· 
ANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 240-46 (1960); see also PATTERSON &: YOUNG, CASES ON INSURANCE 
120 n.3 (4th ed. 1961); VANCE, op. cit. supra note 4, § 157, at 883; Galphin, The Valued 
Policy Statute and the Standard Fire Insurance Policy, ABA SECTION OF INSURANCE, 1954 
PROCEEDINGS 142. Statutes are collected in I JoYCE, op. cit. supra note 31, § 163, 
which is somewhat antedated; but no accessible collection of more recent date seems to 
exist. 
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there are many valued policies. If the distinction between in-
demnity and valued contracts is made on an individual contract 
basis, there should be no subrogation on the numerous valued 
marine or fire insurance policies, especially in those marine in-
surance policies where the valuation clause is decisive for a partial 
as well as a total loss.45 But there seems to be no case where sub-
rogation has been denied in fire or marine insurance because the 
particular policy in question was valued. Nor does it seem likely 
that any court would deny subrogation in such a case. The classi-
fication is made for the whole line, despite the deviant contracts. 
In view of the large number of deviant contracts in fire and 
marine insurance and the lesser but still significant number in 
accident and health insurance, it is hard to justify fixing the 
boundary between lines of insurance when it would be almost as 
easy and far more responsive to the purpose of the distinction to 
consider the terms of the individual contracts. German law would 
make it easier to justify the classification of entire lines inasmuch 
as in Germany valued policies seem unknown in damage insur-
ance. 46 But, like us, the Germans do have some difficulty with 
contracts in the fields of accident and sickness insurance, where 
many contracts contain provisions both for the payment of actual 
damage suffered, and of fixed sums. Like American contracts, 
German insurance policies in accident and sickness insurance 
often promise to recompense the insured for hospital and medical 
costs, including doctors' fees, in addition to the promise to pay 
the traditional scheduled sums. 
Sickness insurance is easy to handle in German law, since there 
is no explicit treatment of it in the Insurance Contract Law. The 
General Policy Conditions for sickness insurance, which are in-
411 See An Act to Codify the Law relating to Marine Insurance, 6 Edw. 7, c. 41, § 27 
(1906); 2 ARNOUl.D, l\I • .o.RINE INSURANCE § 1260 (14th ed. 1954); GILMORE & BLACK, Al>MI• 
RALTY 80-85 (1957): PATTERSON & YOUNG, op. cit. supra note 44, at 109-10. The St. Johns, 
101 Fed. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1900), was a case subrogating the insurer in a total loss case 
despite an extreme undervaluation. 
46 An examination of the General Policy Conditions (see note 47 infra) for the 
various kinds of Schadenversicherung shows that uniformly the coverages are conceived 
as indemnity, not valued, coverages. This is even true for the General Conditions for 
transport insurance at sea (ocean marine) where our practice makes much use of valued 
policies. Finke, Werbung und Wettbewerb in der Versicherung, Teil B, 2. Ordner (a 
loose-leaf service providing full text of the current General Conditions for all lines of 
insurance). PRoLSS, op. cit. supra note 41, also provides the text of most of the General 
Conditions, though not that for ocean marine. 
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corporated in each policy by reference, 47 describe certain of the 
coverages in such a way that they are regarded as damage in-
surance. Others are treated as personal insurance.48 Thereafter, 
the General Policy Conditions stipulate for subrogation for the 
former.49 
Accident insurance is given special attention in the German 
Insurance Contract Law. In general, the subrogation provision, 
which is in another special part dealing with damage insurance, 
is not applicable to accident insurance. However, the General 
Policy Conditions for accident insurance contain, as a collateral 
and supplementary coverage that has the appearance of an after-
thought, provision for reimbursement for certain costs of treat-
ment, including doctors' fees.50 This has the appearance of 
damage insurance, and in fact is so treated in the German sources, 
with the consequence that subrogation is available.51 
The net result is that even though it would be easier for 
German law to classify for subrogation purposes by whole lines, 
instead it comes rather close to distinguishing between damage 
and sum insurance, and between subrogatable and non-subro-
gatable claims, on the basis of individual coverages. This coincides 
in most instances with the division between lines of insurance, 
but does not do so in accident insurance, where a part of the 
contract is treated as damage insurance though most of it is treated 
as sum insurance. 
In American law, it seems likely, however, that there exists an 
unarticulated feeling that somehow fire and marine insurance are 
indemnity contracts in some general conceptual sense, while life 
and accident are not. Then the valued policy cases would have 
to be explained for fire and marine insurance by suggesting that 
the valuation provision is merely a kind of liquidated damages 
clause, used for practical convenience, without changing the basic 
47 The General Policy Conditions (Allgemeine Versicherungsbedingungen) are terms 
very carefully worked out through consultation between the regulatory agency and the 
insurance industry, incorporated by reference in each policy. For a brief discussion of 
this aspect of German insurance regulation, see Kimball, The Purpose of Insurance Regu• 
lation: A Preliminary Inquiry in the Theory of Insurance Law, 45 MINN. L. R.Ev. 471, 
493-95 (1961). 
48 Prolss so concludes in his annotation to the first section of the General Policy 
Conditions for Sickness Insurance. PRoLSS, op. cit. supra note 41, at 670. 
49 Id. at 681-82, § 11(1); 670, § 1 Anm. I. 
50 Id. at 739-40. 
51 Id. at- 257. 
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thrust or nature of the policy. But why is this not true for the 
valuation in policies of life and accident insurance as well?52 Is 
it because one can indemnify another against the loss of property 
by replacing the property with money, but that life or bodily 
integrity are not commensurate with money? Of course, it is 
easier to make a person whole with respect to .a property loss than 
with respect to a loss of life or of limb. But personal insurance is 
seldom designed to compensate for the loss of these intangible 
things; rather it is designed to compensate for the accompanying 
economic losses. In this respect it indemnifies in a general, non-
quantitative sense just as much as do fire and marine insurance. 
If there is a difference, it is only one of degree. No one would 
deny the indemnity character of a policy of fire or theft insurance 
on an animal or a painting. But in fact, the loss of a beloved 
animal or a favorite painting may far transcend the economic loss. 
Yet it is the latter against which the insurance is taken out, and 
which makes it "indemnity" insurance. Moreover, even in per-
sonal insurance there is an underlying assumption that in a 
general way, this kind of insurance too is legitimated because it 
indemnifies for economic loss actually suffered even if there is 
not a precise quantitative equivalence between loss and reim-
bursement. How can such insurance be justified without an 
assumption that loss of life or limb can in considerable measure 
be commuted into a money payment? This notion is deeply im-
bedded in the doctrine of insurable interest, especially in the older 
cases, where the assumption is frequently made that the insurable 
interest in human life must be an economically valuable and not 
merely sentimental interest.53 Academic writers emphasize this 
indemnity element, too, when they speak of the economic value 
of a man's life, or of capitalizing the earning power of a life, as 
the basis for a life insurance program.54 This latent and subtle 
52 I MAY, INSURANCE §§ 7, 8 (4th ed. 1900) states this position forthrightly. But see 
I Couca, INSURANCE § 1.9 (2d ed. 1959). 
53 An Act for Regulating Insurance Upon Lives, 14 Geo. III, c. 48 (1774), in § III 
provided: "[I]n all cases where the insured hath interest in such life or lives, event or 
events, no greater sum shall be recovered or received from the insurer or insurers than 
the amount of value of the interest of the insured in such life or lives, or other event 
or events." The difficulties created by such a blatant indemnity idea in life insurance 
are apparent. For discussion of this statute and of the American cases, see Patterson, 
Insurable Interest in Life, 18 CoLUM. L. REv. 381 (1918). Id. at 410 suggests that a pe-
cuniary interest in the life insured is an essential prerequisite for insurable interest. 
54 DUBLIN, THE MONEY VALUE OF A MAN, chs. 6, 8, 11 (rev. ed. 1947); GREGG, LIFE 
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indemnity element of life insurance becomes very patent and 
clear in life insurance taken out by a creditor on a debtor's life, 
or by a corporation on the life of a key employee, or by one part-
ner on the life of another. It is the economic loss that legitimates 
the policy, and in a general conceptual way it has an indemnity 
thrust.55 Yet we have found no suggestions anywhere that any 
life insurance contract, however clear might be its indemnity 
aspect in the individual case, should be held to be so much an 
indemnity contract as to warrant the application of doctrines of 
subrogation. 
The foregoing discussion is equally pertinent to accident in-
surance, where both the indemnity aspect is even stronger because 
it more nearly approaches an arithmetical equivalence of loss and 
reimbursement, and the valued policy character is much less 
clear and less pervasive than in life insurance. While it is true that 
fixed sums are usually provided for the loss of an arm, a leg, or of 
life, or of working time lost, they need not be. Nothing prevents an 
insurance company from writing insurance against loss of wages 
(to the extent that they are actually lost and not just for a stated 
sum per week), or to reimburse for out-of-pocket expenses for 
medical or hospital services. Many policies do the latter. Even 
when the policy provi4es for a fixed sum, the amount is often in-
tended to be closely related to anticipated loss and thus is a 
"liquidated damages clause," as much as is the valuation clause in 
fire or marine insurance. A leading case does say that a "policy 
of casualty56 insurance, ordinarily, has much the same features 
as one of life insurance, though, it is true, it more nearly than 
one of life insurance has the indemnity feature. The amount 
stipulated to be paid is a fixed sum as to each particular injury 
specified or is computable without any such definite data as in 
case of the loss of property."57 But we find little recognition in 
subsequent cases of the variability of accident and health insur-
ance, and in those cases in which the matter has arisen, such as the 
Michigan Hospital Service case, the indemnity character of the 
AND HEALTH INSURANCE HANDBOOK 4-6, 17-19 (1959); HUEBNER&: BLACK, LIFE INSURANCE 13 
(5th ed. 1958); McGILL, LIFE INSURANCE 4 (1959); MAGEE, LIFE INSURANCE 332 (1958). 
55 Patterson, supra note 53, points out that some life insurance contracts do and 
some do not have an indemnity "purpose." 
56 "Casualty" here means "accident." 
57 Gatzweiler v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. &: Light Co., 136 Wis. 34, 37, 116 N.W. 633, 631 
(1908). 
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particular coverage was not acknowledged.58 Many individual 
policies, or at least coverages within them, simply do not cor-
respond to the classification apparently set up in the doctrines for 
the whole line. Unlike the German law, ours does not seem to 
make the accommodation for the atypical coverage. The refusal 
to apply subrogation doctrines in accident insurance even seems 
to carry over to the medical payments coverage in automobile 
insurance, despite the fact that it is a coverage having the appear-
ance of indemnity insurance, embedded in a contract that is 
largely indemnity in nature. 
Sometimes the indemnity-valued policy (or damage-sum) dis-
tinction is linked with, or perhaps is confused with, another 
reason for denying recovery. That is the nop-identity of loss. Thus, 
in one case subrogation of the accident insurer was denied on 
the ground that the policy did not indemnify for the identical 
loss for which the tortfeasor was responsible. 
"The accident policy undertakes to indemnify the insured 
whether his injuries are the result of negligence or not, while 
the person or corporation inflicting the injuries can be held 
liable only for negligence, and since so many elements enter 
into the estimate of the loss in the case of one that do not 
enter into or form any part of the other, there is wanting 
that identity of damage or loss that would entitle the insurer 
to subrogation on payment of the claim against him."59 
If this identity· of loss argument were taken seriously, it would 
prevent subrogation far beyond the personal insurance field. The 
language used above would be applicable, with very slight 
changes, to most if not all cases of fire, collision, or liability in-
surance where subrogation is standard practice. It expresses an 
argument of the most doubtful validity. 
One difficulty with respect to subrogation applies only to 
158 339 Mich. 357, 63 N.W .2d 638 (1954). But see 7 MICH. L. REv. 177-79 (1908). We 
are struck by the frequency with which accident and health policies on file in the Mich-
igan Insurance Department use the word "indemnity." But Suttles v. Railway Mail Ass'n, 
156 App. Div. 435, 141 N.Y. Supp. 1024 (1913) makes it clear that the use of the word 
alone does not make the policy one of indemnity. This is sound, but neither is the use 
of the word irrelevant. Cf. Lemaitre v. Nat'! Cas. Co., 195 Mo. App. 599, 186 S.W. 964 
(1916). 
159 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Parker, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 521, 523, 72 S.W. 621, 622 (1902), 
modified, 96 Tex. 287, 72 S.W. 168 (1903); Holland v. Morley Button Co., 83 N.H. 482, 
145 Atl. 142 (1929); Newark Paving Co. v. Klotz, 85 N.J.L. 432, 91 Atl. 91 (1914), aff'd, 
86 N.J.L. 690, 92 Atl. 1086 (1914); see also Suttles v. Railway Mail Ass'n, 156 App. Div. 
435, 141 N.Y. Supp. 1024 (1913). 
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cases where there is death. In the older common law, there was 
no action for the death of a human being, nor did an action for 
personal injuries survive the death of the claimant. Clearly in 
such circumstances subrogation would not be available, but for 
reasons having nothing to do with subrogation itself. Where such 
rules have been altered or abrogated, subrogation should be 
available unless there are other reasons for denying it. Naturally 
a person concerned with subrogation in a claim involving death 
would have to examine with care the wrongful death and survival 
statutes, to see whether they are wide enough in scope to give a 
cause of action which is available to him. 
In personal insurance there remains another related difficulty. 
At common law it seems to have been well settled that causes of 
action for personal injuries were not assignable.60 Largely non-
assignability was b<1;sed on the absence of survival and, where 
statutes have made causes of action survive the death of the in-
jured person, very generally the causes of action have become 
assignable. But this is not universally true. In some jurisdictions 
such claims are still not assignable.61 However, it is by no means 
clear that legal subrogation should be limited in the same way as 
assignment, despite a tendency to refer to it as an "equitable" 
assignment. The term "assignment" suggests something volun-
tary, even when it is modified by "equitable," and there is noth-
ing voluntary about legal subrogation. It is created by the law 
( or by equity) in order to do justice, and certainly should not be 
limited by doctrines developed to circumscribe voluntary assign-
ments. 62 When the subrogation is conventional, then the problem 
is a little more di:fficuJt. It is discussed below. 
60 REsrATEMENT, CoNTRAcrs § 547 (1932); Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 500, 502 (1955). 
61 Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 505-12 (1955). 
62 United States v. Aetna Cas. &: Sur. Co., 338 U.S. 366 (1949), held that an anti-
assignment statute, applicable to federal tort claims, does not prevent workmen's com-
pensation subrogees from recovering from the government inasmuch as subrogation is an 
involuntary transfer. "There are many Oklahoma cases holding that tort actions cannot be 
assigned, but we find no case holding that such actions are not subject to the equitable 
adjustment of rights called subrogation •.•. ·we cannot believe that the legislature could 
have intended to abolish the beneficial doctrine of subrogation in tort cases as an indirect 
result of a statute, the primary purpose of which was to abolish nominal parties to law-
suits." American Fid. &: Cas. Co. v. All American Bus Lines, 179 F.2d 7, 11 (10th Cir. 
1949). Staples v. Central Sur. &: Ins. Corp., 62 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1932), held that subro-
gation was not an assignment for diversity of citizenship purposes. Remsen v. Midway 
Liquors, Inc., 30 Ill. App. 2d 132, 174 N.E.2d 7 (1961); City of New York Ins. Co. v. Tice, 
159 Kan. 176, 152 P.2d 836 (1944) (anti-assignment statute applicable to all tort claims 
1962] INSURANCE SUBROGATION 859 
We think it clear that there are significant indemnity aspects 
of all forms of life and disability insurance, as well as of other 
kinds of insurance. Despite this reality, the continued insistence 
that life and accident insurance are not of an indemnity nature 
probably reflects an attitude, which may well be justified, that 
on the whole the amount of available recompense from all life 
and accident insurance and from any tortfeasor and his insurer 
is likely to be inadequate to meet the needs of the victim or his 
survivor. As a broad generalization, it may be true that victims of 
personal injuries are undercompensated, but this would only be 
valid as a generalization. Moreover, if one isolates certain kinds 
of loss, as happens whenever the context is a subrogation suit 
under the medical payments coverage of an automobile policy, 
or under hospitalization or medical expense protection, fairly 
often there is not only adequate but duplicated protection. A 
workman injured on the job may be protected by the workmen's 
compensation laws, by a hospital and medical service plan or by 
a group or individual accident policy, an~ may also have a right 
of action against a solvent or insured tortfeasor. In the end, despite 
the cost of pursuing each of his remedies, he may be overcom-
pensated for a loss that in many instances is purely economic. At 
least he may be doubly compensated for the economic loss, and 
quite adequately compensated by a sympathetic jury for the less 
tangible losses, sucli as pain and suffering. In such cases there is 
little reason to deny subrogation to the insurer who pays the 
tangible economic loss, such as out-of-pocket hospital or medical 
expenses, merely on the questionable ground that accident in-
surance has no "indemnity" nature. If the word "indemnity" 
means anything, it comprehends these cases.63 We conclude, there-
fore, that at least in those cases where there is insurance against 
a loss measurable in economic terms, the insurer should be legally 
subrogated quite as readily as in fire or collision insurance, once 
there has been full indemnification of the insured. Denial of legal 
does not prevent subrogation); REsTATEMENT, REsTmmoN § 162, comment h (1937). 
Contra, Fifield Manor v. Finston, 54 Cal. 2d 632, 354 P .2d 1073 (1960), 59 MICH. L. 
R.Ev. 1256 (1961), 8 U.C.L.A.L. R.Ev. 668, 671 (1961), 109 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 443, 447 (1961); 
City of Richmond v. Hanes, 203 Va. 102, 122 S.E.2d 895 (1961). 
63 In Swedish law, there is no subrogation in life insurance or ordinary accident or 
sickness coverage, but there is subrogation for medical fees and other out of pocket 
expense on the same basis as with other kinds of insurance. HELLNER, FoRSAKRINGSGIVARENS 
R.EGRESSRlTI (The Insurer's Right of Subrogation) 260 (1953). 
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subrogation should reflect the lack of adequate indemnification 
to the insured in the individual case, and nothing more. The 
failure by the courts to allow legal subrogation in at least some 
cases of accident and health insurance is an unfortunate result. 
So far we have spoken only of cases lacking contractual stipulation 
for subrogation, and thus only of legal subrogation. We turn 
now to the question how far agreement may alter the doctrines of 
subrogation applicable in the absence of explicit stipulation. 
III. CONVENTIONAL SUBROGATION 
Quite commonly insurance policies contain stipulations for 
subrogation of the insurer to the claims of the policyholder. In 
most of these policies it makes little difference, since the sub-
rogation right already exists as the creation of equity. In only a 
handful of cases has it been necessary to decide whether a sub-
rogation clause actually created a new right. 
The most important such instance arose in a pair of Michigan 
cases, involving the same injured persons and tortfeasors.64 In 
the first, a participant in the Michigan Hospital Service plan 
(Blue Cross) was injured in an automobile accident caused by a 
negligent third person. The participant was hospitalized and the 
expenses were paid by the service plan, in accordance with the 
contract. Then the participant settled with the tortfeasor and 
gave a release framed to include liability for the hospital expenses. 
The service plan demanded from its subscriber that he pay over 
to the plan the amounts received from the tortfeasor to the ex-
tent of the hospital bill; it also made a claim directly against the 
tortfeasor in the same action, alleging that the tortfeasor had full 
knowledge of the plan's interest, and thus was not discharged by 
the release. The hospital care certificate did not contain a sub-
rogation clause. The court denied subrogation, explaining the 
result in a most unsatisfying opinion. The opinion stated that 
this was not an insurance contract. 65 It also said there was no 
question that the service "was purchased with the understanding 
that hospital care would be furnished the purchaser 'whenever 
64 Michigan Hosp. Serv. v. Sharpe, 339 Mich. 357, 63 N.W.2d 638 (1954); Michigan 
Medical Serv. v. Sharpe, 339 Mich. 574, 64 N.W.2d 713 (1954). 
65 Michigan Hosp. Serv. v. Sharpe, 339 Mich. 357, 370, 63 N.W.2d 638, 639 (1954). See 
Annot., 167 A.L.R. 322 (1947). 
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needed.' . Plaintiff thus had a primary obligation to provide 
service in accordance with the terms of the contract.''66 It follows 
from this formulation, of course, that no subrogation is available. 
What the court fails to see is that the statement that the service 
plan had a "primary obligation" begs the question, for that is 
merely an alternative way of formulating the proposition that sub-
rogation is not available. The question whether there is a primary 
obligation (and hence no subrogation) is much more difficult 
than the court thinks, for there is no clear test of the primacy of 
obligations. Whether the transaction is technically insurance is 
not of the essence, for the problems of subrogation, or of primacy 
of obligation, are not peculiar to insurance, and depend on 
general considerations of fairness that are equally applicable in 
either case. A vigorous dissent insisted not only that the trans-
action was insurance, but also that subrogation was available. 
Despite the weakness of the analysis in the prevailing opinion, the 
case does decide, for Michigan, that a hospital service plan is not 
subrogated to claims against tortfeasors, in the absence of a con-
tractual stipulation therefor. 
The service certificate in the second case, involving medical 
and surgical benefits (Blue Shield), rather than hospitalization 
(Blue Cross), contained an express stipulation for subrogation. 
The justice who wrote the opinion had dissented in the earlier 
case. Accepting the previous result, he stated emphatically that 
the only distinction between the two cases was the presence of 
the subrogation clause in the second, and upheld the service's 
claim to be subrogated on the basis of that difference: 
"Enrichment of plaintiff is not unjust if pursuant to the 
express agreement of the parties, fairly and honestly arrived 
at before hand. It is neither unjust, unfair nor inequitable 
to give effect to an agreement which was not induced by mis-
take, overreaching, fraud or misrepresentation .... To agree 
with defendants that the subrogation clause gave plaintiff no 
rights whatsoever is to read it out of the agreement by render-
ing it meaningless. This a court may not do.''67 
The earlier case had already suggested the distinction: "It is 
66 Id. at !17!!, 6!! N.W.2d at 641. (Emphasis added.) 
or Michigan Medical Serv. v. Sharpe, !!!19 Mich. 574, 577, 64 N.W.2d 71!!, 714 (1954). 
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conclusive that by the very language of the contract not one iota 
of intent on the part of plaintiff to recover for hospital services 
rendered upon accidental injury may be adduced."68 
In the earlier case, the court had held that the hospital service 
plan was not insurance.69 Nor, one would suppose, could the 
medical service plan consistently be regarded as insurance. But 
this does not lessen the importance of the case to the insurance 
field. Subrogation doctrines are not peculiar to insurance, but 
as remedial or restitutionary doctrines created by equity or 
by contract apply in similar manner to insurance and to like con-
tracts that are not quite insurance.70 The same emphasis on the 
freedom of the parties to stipulate for subrogation should apply 
to transactions on both sides of the uncertain boundary between 
insurance and related contracts. Viewed as insurance, this plan 
would be disability insurance, to which legal subrogation has ap-
parently not applied in the past, but to which conventional subro-
gation seemingly can be extended, in the view of the Michigan 
court. 
Frequent dicta suggest that parties to a contract are free to 
stipulate for subrogation. The leading case holding that legal 
subrogation did not apply to accident insurance suggests as much: 
"If it be true that in the absence of some stipulation to the contrary 
a contract of casualty insurance is not ... one of indemnity giving 
rise in the circumstances of this case to the right of subrogation as 
against the party wrongfully causing the injury, and yet the parties 
might give it that character by a stipulation to that effect, so far 
68 Michigan Hosp. Serv. v. Sharpe, 339 Mich. 357, 369-70, 63 N.W.2d 638, 639 (1954). 
'69 Most of the cases deciding this question have dealt with the question whether the 
service plans are subject to the laws regulating insurance. See, e.g., Group Health Ass'n v. 
Moor, 24 F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1938), afj'd sub nom. Jordan v. Group Health Ass'n, 
107 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1939); California Physicians' Serv. v. Garrison, 28 Cal. 2d 790, 
172 P.2d 4 (1946); Commissioner of Banking&: Ins. v. Community Health Serv., 129 N.J.L. 
427, 30 A.2d 44 (1943); State ex Tel. Fishback. v. Universal Serv. Agency, 87 Wash. 413, 
151 Pac. 768 (1915); Annot., 167 A.L.R. 322 (1947). 
70 The generality of the doctrines of subrogation is suggested by the terms of 
REsTATEMENT, REsnronoN § 162 (1937): "Where property of one person is used in dis-
charging an obligation owed by another or a lien upon the property of another, under 
such circumstances that the other would be unjustly enriched by the retention of the 
benefit thus conferred, the former is entitled to be subrogated to the position of the 
obligee or lien-holder.'' One would have difficulty in finding authorities that distinguish 
between insurance and other contracts for the purpose of deciding a subrogation case. 
See also REsTATEMENT, SECURITY § 141, comment a (1941). 
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as we can discover there was no such stipulation in the contract in 
question."71 There may be only a single case refusing effect to 
an express subrogation clause;72 there are a few cases in which 
the question has come up explicitly in which the decision has been 
favorable to subrogation. In addition to the medical service case 
in the text above, a recent New Jersey case gave effect to a stipu-
lation for subrogation of the insurer under the medical payments 
coverage of an automobile policy, though there seems to be no 
legal subrogation in medical payments insurance.73 A recent New 
York case subrogated a commercial disability insurer under a 
group policy covering medical expense benefits,74 and subrogation 
in the guise of a provision for a trust to be held by the injured 
policyholder for the benefit of the insurer was upheld in Illinois 
under an Uninsured Motorist's Endorsement.75 
In answering the question whether stipulation can extend the 
range of subrogation beyond the scope of legal subrogation, the 
important and pervasive public policy in favor of freedom to con-
tract comes into play. Despite a considerable erosion of the force 
of this public policy in the twentieth century, it is still an im-
portant factor in the decision of cases.76 Only considerations of 
substantial weight can overcome it, and then generally only at 
the behest of the legislature. Overt interference by the courts 
with the free decisions of fully competent parties is relatively in-
frequent and occur~ in limited classes of cases. What must be 
decided is whether there are here considerations of enough weight 
to overcome the presumption that agreements should and will be 
enforced in accordance with their terms. 
For the present the question is put aside whether certain social 
problems, such as automobile accidents, are so serious as to justify 
71 Gatzweiler v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 136 Wis. 34, 38, 116 N.W. 633, 
634 (1908). 
72 Fifield Manor v. Finston, 54 Cal. 2d 632, 354 P .2d 1073 (1960), a non-insurance 
case criticized in 59 MICH. L. REv. 1256 (1961), 109 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 668 (1961), 109 U. 
PA. L. REV. 443 (1961). Sec also City of Richmond v. Hanes, 203 Va. 102, 122 S.E.2d 
895 (1961). 
73 Smith v. Motor Club, 54 N.J. Super. 37, 148 A.2d 37, afj'd, 56 N.J. Super. 203, 152 
A.2d 369, petition for certification denied, 30 N.J. 563, 154 A.2d 451 (1959). 
74 Application of Maak, 30 Misc. 2d 610, 222 N.Y.S.2d 845 (Sup. Ct. 1961). 
75 Remsen v. Midway Liquors, Inc., 30 Ill. App. 2d 132, 174 N.E.2d 7 (1961). The 
court emphasized that the trust agreement produced subrogation. 
76 HAVIGHURST, THE NATURE OF PRIVATE CONTRACT 95 (1961); Pound, The Role of the 
Will in Law, 68 HARv. L. REv. 1, 16 (1954). 
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legislative intervention that would eliminate or alter beyond 
recognition the institution of subrogation. The question is also 
put aside whether insurance commissioners have power to de-
cline to approve contract forms containing novel stipulations for 
subrogation and thus determine these public policy questions 
themselves. This article deals only with the question whether 
conventional subrogation should be allowed by the courts in the 
absence of a legislative declaration of policy. By putting the dis-
cussion in this limited frame of reference, the only question raised 
is whether courts are justified in refusing to give effect to freely 
contracted-for stipulations for subrogation. The question is 
formulated in this way despite recognition of the fact that these 
are contracts of adhesion, not freely negotiated contracts. But 
our law takes no explicit account of this except in its contra 
prof erentem rule of interpretation. 
What policy considerations are there of the sort that can 
affect the decision of a court applying common-law principles 
that would lead the court to deny effect to the subrogation clause? 
We have seen that it is not even clear why legal subrogation 
should be denied in life or accident insurance cases, and this 
article has concluded that it rests either on a notion that the con-
tract is in its nature not one of indemnity, or on a notion that in 
most such cases there is doubt whether there has in fact been in-
demnification. In either case it is difficult to see any reason to 
limit the effect of a subrogation clause. If it is doubtful whether 
a contract is of an indemnity nature, the existence of a subrogation 
clause should settle the question.77 The medical payments cov-
erage, or hospital or medical service plans, should be disposed of 
easily by this argument. With a subrogation clause they become, 
if they were not already, indemnity contracts. If it is not doubtful, 
and the contract seems "in its nature" not to be an indemnity con-
tract but something else, then the question may be a bit harder. 
However, the question whether a contract is or is not an indem-
nity contract would seem to be a question of fact, turning on the 
actual intention of the parties. 78 What does one mean by an in-
77 SHELDON, SUBROGATION § 239 (2d ed. 1893). See also 1 COUCH, op. cit. supra note 52, 
§ 1:16. 
78 See 2 HARPER &: JAMES, ToRTS § 25.22, at 1352 (1956). But see Employers' Liab. 
Assur. Corp. v. Daley, 183 Misc. 975, 51 N.Y.S.2d 567 (Sup. Ct. 1944). 
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demnity contract except that the obligation of the indemnitor is 
to make the indemnitee whole, and no more, and why can not 
such a contract be created whenever the parties want? Why should 
not the subrogation clause be as determinative here as in cases 
where the outcome is doubtful in the absence of a stipulation? 
The only situation in which there might seem to be difficulty is 
where it is hard to conceive of full indemnification, as when life 
or bodily integrity is involved. Yet a stipulation that p11rports 
to make such a contract one of indemnity could and perhaps 
should be interpreted as one to reimburse for the economic con-
sequences of the insured event. Whenever there has been full 
compensation for such harm, why should not the stipulated-for 
subrogation follow? It should not matter that the full indemni-
fication that is precedent to subrogation will seldom exist; this 
goes only to the frequency of subrogation claims, not to their 
propriety. Nor should it matter that measurement of the harm 
is extremely difficult; to determine this very question is a normal 
task of the legal system, with which courts and lawyers are well 
acquainted. Such determinations must constantly be made in 
personal injury litigation. But there seems to be an even stronger 
reason for freely allowing conventional subrogation. In those lines 
of insurance in which subrogation normally exists, there are fre-
quent stipulations for subrogation pro tanto, so that the insurer 
will be entitled to first recovery on any amounts recoverable from 
a tortfeasor.79 If one can stipulate in property insurance for sub-
rogation prior to a full indemnification why should a life or 
disability insurer not be allowed to do the same? The fact that 
full indemnification is unusual, difficult to prove, or even difficult 
to conceive, in such lines of insurance, is irrelevant, for ex 
hypothesi the settlement of all questions between insurer and in-
sured has been made independent of full indemnification. No 
doubt any contract providing for subrogation pro tanto should be 
79 Accepted doctrine generally requires full indemnity before subrogation. Annots., 
91 A.L.R. 855 (1934); 53 A.L.R. 304 (1928); 46 A.L.R. 857 (1927); 32 A.L.R. 568 (1924); 9 
A.L.R. 1596 (1920). This seems to be true also in fire insurance. Ward v. Concordia Fire 
Ins. Co., 218 Mo. App. 98, 262 S.W. 450 (1924); McConnell v. Conaway, 62 Ohio App. 335, 
2!1 N.E.2d 970 (1939). One writer has suggested that the subrogation clause of the National 
Standard Automobile Insurance Policy was drafted as it was in order to get around the 
full indemnity rule. Billings, The Significance of Subrogation in Automobile Insurance 
Practice, 1948 INS. L.J. 707, 709. But see King, Subrogation Under Contracts Insuring 
Property, 30 TEXAS L. REv. 62, 68 (1951). 
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carefully scrutinized by the court, but it should then be fully 
enforced in accordance with its terms. 
The Oregon Supreme Court had to deal with a different 
method of achieving the same result in Barmeier v. Oregon Physi-
cians' Service.80 The court felt it unnecessary to decide whether 
the hospital service contract was a contract of insurance, though 
it hinted that _it probably was not, nor did it decide whether 
legal subrogation was applicable to the contract in suit. The 
contract contained a clause providing that the benefits were not 
applicable in the event of injury or illness caused by the negli-
gence or wrongful act of another, except to the extent that the 
injured person should make all reasonable efforts to recover from 
the tortfeasor and be unable to do so. The injured plaintiff re-
covered enough from the tortfeasor to cover the medical and 
hospital expenses, without being able to get enough to pay for 
general damages. Despite the lack of full indemnity in this situa-
tion the court interpreted the contract so as to relieve the defend-
ant physicians' service from liability. This clause was in substance, 
though not in form, a subrogation clause. All arguments in favor 
of permitting the company to stipulate for a reduction in liability 
if money is recoverable from the tortfeasor are equally applicable 
to a stipulation for subrogation, except the argument based on 
form. It may be urged with some force that while the clause in 
the Barmeier case is a part of the definition of the service's obli-
gation, a subrogation clause actually transfers a right of action and 
is, therefore, an assignment, even if the two clauses have identical 
purposes. This argument cannot be wholly discounted; form does 
matter a great deal in the law. If a subrogation clause is an assign-
ment, any policy that exists in the state to prohibit assignment 
would presumably apply. We have seen that it is not difficult to 
distinguish assignment from legal subrogation. It can also be 
argued that there are important differences between conventional 
subrogation and assignment. Though both are voluntary trans-
so 194 Ore. 659, 243 P.2d 1053 (1952). The limitation of coverage to achieve the 
results that would normally be achieved by a valid subrogation clause is very common. 
Many medical expense or hospitalization plans specify that the policy does not cover 
costs for which insured is entitled to reimbursement under workmen's compensation or 
similar laws, or services rendered by Veterans Administration hospitals, or services 
rendered by any government hospital unless there is an unconditional obligation to pay 
for the services. 
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fers, the latter is a transfer of a much more specific nature than is 
subrogation. Assignment involves dangers of maintenance or 
champerty; subrogation does not .. Assignment generally involves 
some consideration moving from the assignee. Subrogation in-
volves no explicit consideration, and at most contemplates some 
reduction in a consideration moving from the assignor. Assign-
ment is the transfer of a subsisting debt; subrogation comes into 
being by the payment of the debt. There are many reasons, thus, 
for treating conventional subrogation as a very peculiar kind of 
assignment, if it is assignment at all. It is difficult to know how 
far courts would distinguish between assignment and conventional 
subrogation in order to uphold the latter while denying validity 
to the former. In Michigan Medical Serv. v. Sharpe81 the court 
gave effect to the subrogation stipulation, but in Michigan a cause 
of action for personal injuries is now assignable.81a On the other 
hand, a recent New Jersey case82 gave effect to a stipulation for 
subrogation in medical payments insurance despite the fact that 
New Jersey apparently still regards personal injury actions as 
unassignable.83 In City of New York Ins. Co. v. Tice84 the Kansas 
Supreme Court upheld a subrogation claim under collision cov-
erage although this kind of claim could not be assigned. The court 
treats the case as one of conventional subrogation, since there was 
a subrogation clause. Realistically, however, the distinction the 
court made between conventional subrogation and assignment 
must be regarded-as dictum, albeit a singularly persuasive one, 
since even in the absence of the subrogation clause subrogation 
would surely have been upheld. The California case of Fifield 
81 339 Mich. 574, 64 N.W.2d 713 (1954). 
Sla Grand Rapids &: I.R. Co. v. Cheboygan Circuit Judge, 161 Mich. 181, 126 N.W. 
56 (1910). 
82 Smith v. Motor Club, 54 N.J. Super. 37, 148 A.2d 37, aff'd, 56 N.J. Super. 203, 
152 A.2d 369, petition for certification denied, 30 N.J. 563, 154 A.2d 451 (1959). 
83 Goldfarb v. Reicher, ll2 N.J.L. 413, 171 Atl. 149, aff'd, ll3 N.J.L. 399, 174 Atl. 
507 (1934); Weller &: Lichtenstein v. Jersey City, St. Ry. Co., 68 N.J. Eq. 659, 61 Atl. 
459 (1905); and see Zurich Gen. Acc.&: Liab. Ins. Co. v. Ackerman Bros., 124 N.L.J. 187, 
11 A.2d 52 (1940), in which after an employee recovered under the New York Workmen's 
Compensation Act, and the claim was assigned to the New York employer's insurance 
carrier who then brought suit in New Jersey against the tortfeasor, it was held that the 
assignment provided for by New York statute was subrogation and was valid. 
84 159 Kan. 176, 152 P.2d 836 (1944). Katz, Automobile Payments Coverage-A 
Changing Concept?, 28 INs. CouNsEL J. 277 (1961), relies too heavily on this case, not 
recognizing it as dictum; see also Redmon v. Salisbury Co., 178 Kan. 639, 290 P.2d 
809 (1955). 
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Manor v. Finston,85 dealing with a contract outside the insurance 
institution but rather closely related to it, denied effect to a sub-
rogation clause and placed the denial explicitly on the ground 
that subrogation is assignment and assignment of such a cause 
of action is forbidden by the California statutes. 
The limited case law is thus equivocal. There is authority 
for distinguishing between assignment and conventional subro-
gation, and there is authority for treating them as the same. But 
at most the objection is one that relates to form and it can surely 
be evaded by techniques that insurance companies use now. Trust 
receipts and loan receipts are two devices of long standing that 
are useful to avoid any questions about assignability or that other 
similar technical problem to which we have not yet adverted-
real-party-in-interest statutes that compel the insurer to appear 
in the subrogation suit in its own right, when it would prefer to 
be active but anonymous.86 Moreover, the device of restricting 
coverage used in the Barmeier case87 would seem to be equally 
effective. A technical objection is thus met with an equally tech-
nical evasive device. Unless there are policy reasons of much 
greater weight than any we have been able to perceive that mili-
tate against conventional subrogation in those insurance contracts 
that have not previously been thought of as indemnity contracts, 
insurance companies should be able to stipulate for subrogation 
at will and on any terms they wish, whether· by that name or in 
the guise of a loan agreement, a trust arrangement, or a limitation 
on coverage. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The distinction that has been drawn hitherto between in-
demnity and investment contracts in discussing legal subrogation 
is a tenuous one, or at least has been somewhat ineptly applied. 
Legal subrogation ought to be extended by courts considerably 
beyond the generally assumed range of its application, to all con-
tracts in which there is, in fact, a full indemnification of the 
policyholder. In particular, the court should act to eliminate a 
85 54 Cal. 2d 632, 354 P.2d 1073 (1960). 
86 2 RICHARDS, INSURANCE 692-701 (5th ed. 1952); see also City of Richmond v. Hanes, 
203 Va. 102, 122 S.E.2d 895 (1961). 
87 Banneier v. Oregon Physicians' Serv., 194 Ore. 659, 243 P.2d 1053 (1952). 
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great many of the double recoveries that are now possible where 
accident and health insurance overlaps with workmen's compen-
sation, claims against solvent tortfeasors, or other sources of com-
pensation. Moreover, on the basis of existing doctrine the courts 
have little justification for denying to insurance companies free-
dom to stipulate for subrogation in cases where the courts have 
thus far not recognized legal subrogation. This would seem to 
apply not only in cases like medical payments or hospital ex-
penses coverages where the contract is in reality an indemnity 
contract, but also to accident insurance generally or to life in-
surance, where it is much less clearly so. The subrogation stipu-
lation should be completely effective to define the terms of the 
subrogation right, whatever the kind of insurance. 
This leads to a more important and ultimate question with 
which this article does not deal. An extension of subrogation may 
have as one result that it eliminates a double recovery-a wind-
fall-to the policyholder. In general, this is a salutary consequen.ce. 
Windfalls and excessive recoveries are widely thought to produce 
a moral hazard, and thus to be objectionable. Moreover, they 
increase the cost of insurance without serving any useful purpose. 
On the other hand, an extension of subrogation may have a dif-
ferent consequence that has much less social utility. To allow 
subrogation contracts the umbrella of protection that is or can 
be afforded by the insurance policy, so that it does not protect, 
in even a limited sense, those persons against whom subrogation is 
claimed, and who would or could receive a measure of protection 
in the absence of subrogation. To determine whether this con-
sequence is desirable, one must enter into a detailed consideration 
of the context of each kind of insurance policy and its social 
purpose. This involves a critical examination of the costs and 
consequences to society as a whole of various methods of loss 
distribution. The extension of subrogation is likely to involve 
increased total costs, since it tends to necessitate two insurance 
policies, one against property loss and the other against liability, 
when the first alone could do the job. It also tends to increase the 
burdens of courts. But the problem is complex and this is not 
the place to enter judgment.BB 
88 For an introduction to the writing and cases raising the ultimate policy issues, see 
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The policy considerations that might lead to the abrogation 
of subrogation are considerations that are peculiarly within the 
competence of the legislature and not of the court, since they 
involve major changes in received common-law doctrine in order 
to solve social problems of serious magnitude. The automobile 
accident problem is an obvious candidate for a study directed 
to such wide-ranging changes. Some provocative things have 
already been written on this subject.89 Fire insurance might 
equally be suggested for consideration, at least in the event that 
insurance companies should move to make subrogation claims 
more frequently in fire insurance. There has been some recent 
indication of a renewed interest in pursuing fire insurance subro-
gation claims more frequently and more systematically than 
before.110 One recent speaker who urged additional attention to 
fire subrogations told of a nearly overlooked subrogation case. 
A dwelling was damaged by fire caused by an over-heated furnace. 
An inquisitive adjuster investigated and found that a diaphragm 
was installed upside down by an employee of the manufacturer of 
the furnace. The error was missed by the company's inspector, by 
the distributor, by the heating contractor who installed it, by the 
electrician who wired the furnace and turned it on, by the gas 
company inspector, and by the county inspector. Naturally, 
a subrogation suit resulted against these various potential 
defendants.111 
What would be the consequence of such subrogation suits? 
In general it would be to shift the loss from the owner of the 
building to the fire insurer, thence to the negligent person, and 
:q.nally to the latter's liability insurer. In the end the litigation 
would probably be fought between two insurance companies. In 
the absence of liability insurance the probable consequence would 
GREGORY &: KAI.VEN, CASES ON TORTS 689-787, esp. 767 (1959); 2 HARPER &: JAMES, TORTS 
§§ 25.19-.23 (1956); James, Social Insurance and Tort Liability: The Problem of Alterna• 
tive Remedies, 27 N.Y.U.L. R.Ev. 537, 557 (1952). See also the discussion of the Beveridge 
plan in England and resulting legislation in Friedmann, Social Insurance and the Princi-
ples of Tort Liability, 63 HARV. L. R.Ev. 241, 253-58 (1949); HELLNER, FoRSXKRINGSGIVARENS 
R.EGRESSRATT (The Insurer's Right of Subrogation) (1953); Ehrenzweig, Book Review, 2 
AM. J. COMP. L. 562 (1953). 
81l See ibid. 
90 See authorities cited note 12, supra. 
91 National Undenvriter (F &: C ed.), February 9, 1962, p.32. 
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be bankruptcy for the tortfeasor. There is little social advantage 
in a repeated shifting of the loss, especially from one insurer 
to another. The gain to the insurer is apt to be illusory, for 
what it gains in a case in which it is the fire insurer, it loses in 
another in which it is liability insurer. Moreover, repeated trans-
fer of losses is an expensive matter, and socially it is much more 
efficient to handle the money only once, especially if litigation 
costs can thereby be avoided. In general, loss insurance should 
be more efficient than liability insurance as a way to distribute 
the cost of fires in our society. This social saving can be achieved 
fairly easily by abrogating subrogation altogether in fire insur-
ance, except perhaps for carefully defined cases of willful destruc-
tion or grossly negligent destruction of the property.92 Although 
a strong case can doubtless be made for such a change, as a major 
improvement in our arrangements for handling such problems, 
it makes drastic changes in our private law, as this article has tried 
to show. Such a change is one that courts have been reluctant to 
make, for it brings strangers within the protection of the policies 
in violation of the principle that persons not parties to contracts 
and not intended beneficiaries should not have rights under them. 
For this reason, it is a change that will probably have to be made 
by the legislature, if it gets made at all. But there may be other 
ways to approach the problem. One is for fire insurance com-
panies voluntarily to give up subrogation rights in certain classes 
of cases. At least one state insurance commissioner has urged this 
upon fire insurance companies as a matter of claims practice.93 
Another approach would be the revision of the insurance policy 
itself, to abrogate subrogation and, in effect, to extend the um-
brella of protection to include the tortfeasor who is merely neg-
ligent. In fire insurance this has a special difficulty, that the 
insurance policy is a statutory one, but this is not a serious dif.. 
ficulty for other lines of insurance. However, it is important in 
this article only to suggest that there may be many problems to 
92 Swedish law has abrogated subrogation in indemnity insurance in cases of ordi-
nary negligence, but not in cases of international torts, gross negligence, or strict liability. 
HELLNER, op. cit. supra note 88, at 260-61. It is not apparent why strict liability should 
be classified with intentional torts for this purpose. Friedman, Landlords, Tenants and 
Fires-Insurer's Right of Subrogation, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 225 (1957), deals with one narrow 
aspect of this larger problem. 
93 Hon. Donald Knowlton of New Hampshire, in a statement made about 1950, and 
confirmed by letter of October 19, 1961, to the author. 
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which abrogation of subrogation would be a desirable solution, 
and that the conclusions of this paper are limited to cases where 
there has not been a special examination of such problems. Abro-
gation should be carefully considered in each separate context, 
and any change that is made may well have to be a legislative 
and not a judicial act. 
